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Today more than ever “Spaceship Earth” is an apt metaphor as we chart the planetary 11 
boundaries for a safe planet1. Social scientists both analyse why society courts disaster by 12 
approaching or even overstepping these boundaries, and we try to design suitable policies to 13 
avoid these perils.  Since the threats of transgressing planetary boundaries are global, long-14 
run, uncertain and interconnected they must be analysed together to avoid conflicts and take 15 
advantage of synergies. To obtain policies that are effective at both international and local 16 
levels requires careful analysis of the underlying mechanisms across scientific disciplines and 17 
approaches and to take politics into account. 18 
 19 
Recent literature on the “Anthropocene” suggests multiple threats to the resilience of the 20 
Earth system. Exceeding “planetary boundaries” could lead to rapidly increasing risks of 21 
catastrophic and/or irreversible environmental change2-6. Acknowledging underlying 22 
scientific disagreements and considerable uncertainties, we note there are many articles 23 
describing human dominance of the planet7 and here we take the planetary boundaries as 24 
given and focus on the design of policy and governance structures in response to the risks of 25 
overstepping them. There are no simple solutions. Design issues are complex and challenging 26 
precisely because the threats are global, long-run, inter-connected, uncertain, and potentially 27 
irreversible8. Nevertheless, we have identified seven guiding principles:  28 
1. Inherent complexities necessitate interdisciplinary collaboration in the design of 29 
appropriate policies and governance systems. 30 
2. In order to identify the appropriate strength and type of policy it is important to 31 
ascertain how serious the environmental problems are. If possible to measure, this 32 
could be given by the distance to the various boundaries. 33 
3. Links across planetary boundaries often necessitate considering two or more of them 34 
together—both because policy approaches tackling one boundary may lead to 35 
3 
 
“ancillary” benefits elsewhere, and because of potential conflicts, where a policy that 36 
mitigates human impacts on one dimension exacerbates threats to another. 37 
4. Despite the novelty and complexity of the task, a number of well-known policy 38 
instruments exist. The challenge, thus, is not to invent entirely new approaches, but to 39 
select and design appropriate policies given specific scientific, societal, and political 40 
contexts. 41 
5. Instrument selection depends on a proper diagnosis of the socioeconomic cause(s) 42 
underlying the problem, focused on the most significant points of leverage. 43 
6. Effective policy choice and design needs to be based on efficiency, achieving desired 44 
outcome at lowest costs, but must also consider “political” criteria such as the 45 
distribution of costs and resistance by powerful vested interests. 46 
7. Finally, global problems need policy instruments and agreements that are operational 47 
at both international and local levels, to ensure not only efficient outcomes but also 48 
effective jurisdiction and governance. 49 
 50 
Planetary boundaries and the Anthropocene 51 
The term Anthropocene has been proposed to characterize the current geological epoch2. 52 
Although its formal stature and starting date are subject to debate9, it is here sufficient that the 53 
term is commonly used to connote the current period when human activity dominates the 54 
development of global ecosystems. We use the planetary boundaries framework as a starting 55 
point for policy analysis since it suggests a number of clear restrictions and implications. 56 
Planetary boundary research attempts to define (i) the key processes that determine the state 57 
of the Earth system, and (ii) quantitative boundaries for these processes inside which the risk 58 
of triggering a shift to another equilibrium is acceptably low10. Not all planetary boundaries 59 
are associated with risks of planetary-scale tipping points, but crossing any one increases the 60 
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risk of catastrophic change. Nine planetary boundaries have been suggested3 and four of these 61 
may already have been transgressed4. Some boundaries such as climate change and biosphere 62 
integrity, the “sixth mass extinction”11, have received much attention, but all need more 63 
research. Table 1 lists boundaries and their main driving forces. Although the exact positions 64 
of planetary boundaries are uncertain, policies are motivated by risk of passing them. 65 
Appropriate policy design and stringency level will depend on the distance to each planetary 66 
boundary (Figure 1). If a boundary has been transgressed, policy efforts must focus on rapidly 67 
returning the system to a safer state. Given the ecological complexities involved, precaution is 68 
warranted in policy-making when it concerns drivers leading to possible transgressions of 69 
planetary boundaries, particularly in the “uncertainty” or “high risk” zones12-15. 70 
FIGURE 1  71 
TABLE 1 72 
To date, natural scientists working in this area have focused on characterizing planetary 73 
boundaries rather than suggesting “how to manoeuvre within the safe operating space in the 74 
quest for global sustainability”4. We here focus on policy design. The driving forces behind 75 
the unsustainable use of environmental resources, which threaten planetary boundaries, are 76 
principally economic. They are caused by growth in population and income but also changes 77 
in behaviour and technology. To a significant extent, they are the result of misguided market 78 
forces. Designing policies and institutions to deal with these challenges, thus, requires an 79 
understanding of how economies work, the relevant trade-offs, and the roles of incentives and 80 
political barriers to policy implementation. This is a task for social scientists16. Hitherto, the 81 
social sciences have delivered some conceptual insights concerning political challenges 82 
associated with planetary boundaries17-20, and proposed institutional architectures for 83 
governance and to avoid undesirable environmental problem shifting21-23. Here we take a 84 
further step by categorizing and discussing specific policy instruments. Although an approach 85 
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has emerged that treats ecosystems as natural “assets” that are prone to irrevocable change 86 
and collapse14,15,24, only recently have economists begun to appreciate the urgency of 87 
applying such methods to the global scale of planetary boundaries25-26. 88 
Collaboration across a range of disciplines will be crucial to designing effective policies. For 89 
simple issues, the process can be sequential: ecologists identify threats; engineers, say, 90 
suggest solutions; and social scientists propose effective and efficient policies to encourage 91 
achievement of these solutions. However, for the complex, large-scale problems of the 92 
Anthropocene, sequential policy formulation is oft inadequate. Researchers and practitioners 93 
from different disciplines need to collaborate at each stage of the process in order to ensure a 94 
more complete view of possible outcomes, potential policy interventions, and their likely 95 
consequences. We attempt to integrate knowledge from multiple fields to synthesize insights 96 
and challenges regarding policies for planetary boundaries. We start, in the next section, by 97 
explaining the root causes of large-scale environmental problems and how society can design 98 
instruments to address them. We then discuss, in turn, coordination between policies at 99 
different levels and for different planetary boundaries, spatial and other complexities, political 100 
considerations such as vested interests and distributional issues, and the importance of 101 
considering socioeconomic dynamics such as demographic change and technical progress. 102 
 103 
The Design of Policy Instruments 104 
Most environmental problems—from local smog to transgressions of planetary boundaries—105 
share a common cause: misguided incentives. This key insight from economics is central to 106 
the design of effective policies. It is typically linked to so-called “market failures”, though it 107 
can equally be due to policy failures, if policy makers are ill-informed or corrupted by special 108 
interests. Market failures include externalities, public goods, and asymmetric access to 109 
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information. A common feature is that property rights are not fully assigned; certain resources 110 
or actions are “free” from the perspective of the firm or household, though scarce and costly 111 
to society. For example, polluters may freely dispose of effluents, leading to eutrophication, 112 
or chemicals, causing health hazards and threats to planetary boundaries (such as 6-9 in Table 113 
1). The broad solution is to internalize these societal costs so that each individual decision-114 
maker faces the true costs of his/her actions on society. Polluters need to face this cost to 115 
choose appropriate inputs and production technologies. Consumers must also see the full cost 116 
of pollution reflected in product prices to make appropriate purchasing decisions. While this 117 
principle is simple—only proper incentives lead to appropriate actions—actual policy design 118 
and implementation are complicated by factors as varied as ecological complexity of non-119 
linear changes, thresholds, possible irreversibilities, and complex spatial-temporal dynamics 120 
on the one hand, and politics on the other. The latter includes factors such as fairness, market 121 
structure, lobbying power, asymmetric information, risks, and uncertainties. 122 
High prices of polluting inputs such as oil, rare minerals, or agricultural products not only 123 
stimulate efficiency and frugality in use, they also stimulate increased supply. When this 124 
supply poses a threat to sustainability, this demands high prices for using polluting resources 125 
but low prices for supplying them—a wedge between the user and producer prices. This can 126 
be achieved most directly by a tax (or tradable permits).  127 
Due to the scale of the human enterprise, planetary-scale environmental problems abound. 128 
The interconnectedness of their causes—and their solutions—often leads to environmental 129 
problem shifting: Since the 1970s, the local environment in many wealthy countries has 130 
improved, sometimes significantly. Yet often the improvement has been achieved at the 131 
expense of deterioration elsewhere. That goes for outsourcing of pollution across national 132 
borders. It also goes for substituting one pollutant for another. Many countries have addressed 133 
smoke pollution from wood fires by switching to fossil-powered thermal stations, one of the 134 
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main drivers of climate change. Similarly, mitigating climate change using solar technology 135 
may increase dependence on rare Earth elements or entirely novel entities. The “theory of 136 
second best”27 provides important lessons for dealing with interacting policies. A key result is 137 
that policies that, in isolation, are deemed less efficient than taxes in addressing a particular 138 
problem—e.g., technology mandates or performance standards—can become preferable when 139 
interactions with other problems are taken into account28. More generally, potential shifts 140 
across planetary boundaries provide a strong motivation for assessing the effectiveness of 141 
different policy instruments on all affected boundaries simultaneously, using the conceptual 142 
framework of and, ideally, an actual global “general equilibrium model”, a tool that allows 143 
the researcher to study the dynamic interactions in an economy rather than being confined to 144 
partial analyses or simple rules of thumb. Such an analysis requires careful calibration of 145 
interactions and interdependences across planetary boundaries and associated policy 146 
instruments. 147 
Meanwhile, policies cannot only focus on incorporating the right price for pollution in 148 
individuals’ decisions. They must also encourage research, development, and deployment 149 
(RD&D) of less polluting technology. The task is to motivate individuals to engage in 150 
activities that benefit society, using, for instance, direct subsidies29. Table 2 gives a broad 151 
overview of available policy instruments, focussing on those implemented at the local and 152 
national level. Effective use of policy instruments requires mature governance institutions, 153 
while transboundary issues require international coordination, discussed later. Depending on 154 
the exact nature of market failures, policy instruments can take one of four general forms: 155 
“Pigouvian”, which directly affect pollution prices through taxes or subsidies; “Coasian”, 156 
which directly affect pollution quantities, while allowing for these quantities to be traded; 157 
“traditional” regulatory mechanisms that set out rules and quantity limits that cannot be 158 
traded; and “indirect” interventions in areas such as finance, law, information access, or 159 
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societal norms that affect incentives in ways other than through prices, quantities, or direct 160 
regulations. 161 
 162 
TABLE 2 163 
 164 
Table 2 also depicts a further dimension—the all-important distribution of costs. The costs of 165 
abating pollution and respecting planetary boundaries can be borne either by the polluters or 166 
by society at large, the “victims” of the pollution. The choice may be based on norms, legal 167 
considerations, or simply a realistic assessment of what is politically possible given the 168 
strengths of public opinion and corporate lobbyism. For each category of policies (columns), 169 
the top row shows instruments which assign the pollution or resource rights to the victims of 170 
pollution or society at large, and thereby require that the polluters bear the costs; the bottom 171 
row lists instruments if the polluters hold these rights and, therefore, society (or pollution 172 
victims) must pay for abatement. This is clearest in column 2 where polluters may either have 173 
to buy tradable permits or certificates (top), or be given them for free (bottom). Similarly, in 174 
column 1, the traditional Pigouvian instrument, taxation, implicitly allocates rights to society. 175 
On the opposite end, subsidising polluters to abate essentially gives pollution rights to 176 
businesses29. Similarly, the instruments listed in columns 3-4 may be more or less generous to 177 
the polluters, as shown by the difference between bans, zoning, or other regulations that force 178 
industry on the one hand, and permits or even voluntary agreements on the other. There is a 179 
similar difference between strict and negligence liability, where the latter gives more rights to 180 
the polluter. This dimension of who pays is crucial for perceptions of fairness and—in a world 181 
of oft-powerful vested interests, where issues of wealth inequality and environmental 182 
degradation are typically intertwined—for political feasibility30,31. 183 
Examples of effective taxation include taxes on chemicals and fertilizers32, carbon taxes in 184 
Sweden, and fuel taxes in Europe33. The latter have increased fuel prices substantially 185 
9 
 
compared to the US, resulting in much lower per capita fuel use34. Examples of subsidies 186 
include payments for ecosystem services that improve forest cover or reduce pollution of 187 
rivers35. Perversely, subsidies for coal technologies are still common, indicating the lobbying 188 
power of this sector. Taxes and subsidies can also be combined as in deposit-refund schemes 189 
or so-called “bonus malus” policies that combine fees on gas-guzzling cars with subsidies to 190 
cleaner vehicles36. Another large-scale example is refunded emissions fees for Nitrogen 191 
oxides in Sweden37. Voluntary agreements are extensively used in Japan, where a powerful 192 
industry has been successful at avoiding state intervention by “voluntarily” agreeing to 193 
abate38. 194 
Smart instrument design is important, not least to limit costs of policy implementation. While 195 
transgressing planetary boundaries can impose large and increasing costs on society25,38, and 196 
while arguments that adopting appropriate policies will be prohibitively costly are likely 197 
exaggerated38-40, policy costs do matter, not least politically. Vested interests seek to 198 
minimize their costs so policy makers may face the political necessity of either appeasing 199 
polluters by allocating them more rights or decreasing costs by using instruments that 200 
promote efficiency. That entails choosing appropriate instruments and implementation 201 
strategies to minimize the cost of attaining the desired outcome. The policy challenge is to 202 
find the best way to combine, complement and enhance the array of available instruments to 203 
tackle the complex, large-scale and often global environmental problems identified by any 204 
one planetary boundary or by multiple boundaries in a cost-effective manner, and to avoid 205 
lock-in along any one particular path. 206 
 207 
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Coordinating across geographies and themes  208 
Within any one political jurisdiction, all policy instruments are, at least in principle, available. 209 
Global policymaking, which is especially important for those planetary boundaries linked to 210 
global pollutants, such as climate change, ocean acidification, and novel entities, must be 211 
forged despite the broad absence of governance structures powerful enough to enforce 212 
regulations or taxes at a global level. International policy-making, hence, must rely on 213 
negotiation and coordination. 214 
The inadequate scope of existing institutions to provide coordinated global action8,41 is 215 
compounded by disparities in income, wealth, and culture31, as well as strong incentives not 216 
to cooperate in addressing global pollutants, such as carbon dioxide and ozone. Any 217 
international policy-making then depends on a balance of top-down, negotiated agreements on 218 
the one hand and bottom-up, local interventions on the other. Both call for starting with small 219 
steps using those instruments that are feasible, test their effectiveness, and subsequently 220 
gradually increase scope, levels of stringency, and ambition42. In some cases, linking across 221 
issues (such as multiple planetary boundaries, or other domains like agriculture and trade) can 222 
be a viable strategy. 223 
An alternative path forward would be the creation of new institutions capable of harmonizing 224 
global decisions—moving toward governance structures that facilitate coordination rather 225 
than cooperation43. Whatever the approach, it should allow for strengthening (or, 226 
occasionally, loosening) of targets over time to account for the distance to planetary 227 
boundaries (Figure 1). 228 
Coordination is not only necessary geographically but also thematically, since planetary 229 
boundaries are connected across various dimensions. The right combination of immediate 230 
implementation strategies, national policies, and international actions should address more 231 
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than one boundary. Table 3 illustrates one possible approach, by suggesting how these 232 
different policies could be combined to tackle multiple planetary boundaries at once. 233 
TABLE 3 234 
 235 
As Table 3 shows, the nine planetary boundaries can be regrouped to indicate which have the 236 
strongest mutual links, while noting connections to other boundaries. Determining these 237 
shared links among boundaries facilitates identification of policies that help mitigate several 238 
problems at once, or at least not worsen one while addressing another. 239 
Table 3 also suggests that the physical characteristics that differentiate the key threats to 240 
planetary boundaries dictate alternative approaches. For example, the planetary boundaries for 241 
climate change and ocean acidification are strongly linked because they share a common main 242 
pollutant—carbon dioxide—which, in turn, is linked to global fossil fuel use and land-use 243 
changes, in turn drivers for several other boundaries. Thus, an immediate implementation 244 
strategy would be to reduce subsidies to fossil fuels, introduce or expand research, 245 
development, and deployment policies for renewable energy and establish better policies for 246 
land use and freshwater management. For pollutants such as carbon dioxide, the location of 247 
pollution is unimportant, pointing to Pigouvian or Coasian approaches that help minimize 248 
costs to polluters37. 249 
Additionally, the global nature of the pollutant identifies carbon dioxide emissions “leakage” 250 
as a concern, which occurs when businesses or consumers in one jurisdiction increase 251 
pollution in response to abatement elsewhere. Preventing leakage requires international 252 
action, hence the need for two-tier policy instruments such as international treaties 253 
concerning national carbon pricing. A similar approach is relevant to control global pollutants 254 
threatening the planetary boundaries for atmospheric aerosol loading and novel entities. 255 
 256 
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Dealing with spatial & ecological complexity 257 
Most threats driving toward the planetary boundaries for biosphere integrity (biodiversity 258 
loss), land-system change, freshwater use, and biogeochemical flows arise at the local, 259 
national, or regional level. International coordination is desirable to mitigate leakage but 260 
especially needed to improve management of key shared resources, such as international river 261 
basins, international waters, or major forest biomes, such as the Amazon. Still, 262 
overwhelmingly, it is national, local, and regional land-use practices that must change in order 263 
to maintain well-functioning ecosystems16,24. This points to domestic strategies that can be 264 
highly effective despite the lack of international coordination. These include the elimination 265 
of agricultural, fishing, mining, forestry and aquaculture subsidies, improved regulation of 266 
primary product industries, and water use pricing and regulation, supplemented by a host of 267 
additional policies including mining taxes and regulations, hazardous waste regulation, land-268 
fill and waste charges, and new protected areas44-46. 269 
A key success factor for national, regional, and local policies is to incorporate dynamic 270 
aspects of a “socio-ecological” system, such as 1) variation and connectivity, and 2) processes 271 
with different time scales and feedback mechanisms. Socio-ecological systems are complex 272 
adaptive systems where local interactions give rise to changes at the local, regional, and even 273 
global scale. They are challenging to manage because they can exhibit non-marginal changes, 274 
looming slow structural changes, spatial and temporal variation, and strategic conscious 275 
behaviour among actors47,48. 276 
Biosphere integrity and climate change, for example, are two complex dynamic issues 277 
exhibiting strong connections to each other and to other boundaries2-4,10. Staying within the 278 
climate boundary requires not only steep reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions but also 279 
healthy ecosystems to store carbon. Such ecosystems also prevent biodiversity loss, safeguard 280 
freshwater supplies, and provide multiple other linked benefits10,16. Management of land 281 
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system changes must recognize these multiple benefits and the trade-offs that are inevitable 282 
when change is induced within a socio-ecological system24. 283 
Correct pricing of multiple externalities, meanwhile, requires knowledge of both market and 284 
ecological interactions48. For example, carbon pricing will reduce the pressure on the climate 285 
change boundary as well as of ocean acidification and biochemical flows (Figure 2). Yet it 286 
will also tend to increase the appeal of biofuels, which may imply negative consequences for 287 
boundaries such as land-system change and biosphere integrity. Thus, policy coordination 288 
across domains, such as the UN framework conventions charged with climate and 289 
biodiversity, is essential to ensure effective stewardship across multiple boundaries, avoiding, 290 
for example, that biofuels policies aimed at addressing one boundary exacerbate another. 291 
FIGURE 2 292 
 293 
Keeping within planetary boundaries requires that we make better and more cost-effective use 294 
of the finite resources and sinks available to us31. A better understanding of the spatial 295 
distribution of natural capital and the ecosystem goods and services it provides can improve 296 
the efficiency and sustainability of resource use24. While the spatial distribution of policies to 297 
combat ocean acidification is largely irrelevant due to its global nature, the spatial targeting of 298 
biodiversity measures is perhaps the single biggest determinant of their success. This becomes 299 
more challenging where the distribution of ecosystem services and the beneficiaries of those 300 
services are both spatially heterogeneous. Yet despite the obvious importance of the need to 301 
target resources in such situations, a failure to consider location is a common hallmark of 302 
many environmental policies. Physical, ecological—and spatial—factors are important 303 
determinants of value and economics can help articulate such information for decision makers 304 
in terms of the social costs and benefits of alternative plans. 305 
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Lastly, fast and slow dynamics with reinforcing feedbacks can generate surprising regime 306 
shifts. Hence, an optimal policy must manage these complex dynamics to improve efficiency 307 
at all system levels. For example, coral growth or shoreline development can lead to regime 308 
shifts49, and responses to prevent these can come too late13. Trying to recover after a shift, if 309 
possible at all, would require reversing powerful dynamics and thus need massive 310 
interventions50. Dealing with ecological complexities and possible tipping points calls for 311 
rapidly increasing policy stringency, even substantially before actual evidence of an 312 
impending threshold or boundary is found. A precautionary policy approach becomes optimal 313 
if a regime shift would generate new system dynamics, and human activities can influence 314 
that risk, as in multispecies fisheries15. Under acute threats of crossing thresholds where social 315 
costs rise rapidly, quantity regulation (e.g., permits) is superior to price-based instruments 316 
(e.g. taxes)51, and if the risk of a shift is steeply increasing, a safe standard may be the best 317 
policy14. Planetary boundaries themselves are examples of such safe standards3-4,25.  318 
 319 
Political economy and fairness 320 
Establishing property rights can be seen as a policy intervention directly aimed at addressing 321 
severe market failures. Establishing such rights, however, poses important institutional 322 
challenges, especially in countries with weak institutions. Much attention must be paid to 323 
equity, justice, and local norms. Meanwhile, property rights do not need to be individual or 324 
private. Extensive evidence points to how common property arrangements may work well 325 
under certain conditions52. Protecting biodiversity, for example, can sometimes be facilitated 326 
by institutions that assign and defend clear property rights53,54, but it also requires engagement 327 
by many local stakeholders and active support from public authorities. Rights-based fisheries 328 
management provides valuable lessons in how private and societal interests can be better 329 
aligned to reduce tensions between industry and regulators55. Once assigned, clear property 330 
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rights should, in principle, allow for the efficient operation of market mechanisms. For 331 
example, adopting the legal convention that farmers have the right to pollute waterways 332 
provides the basis for “payment-for-ecosystem-services” arrangements, resulting in win-win 333 
outcomes where water companies achieve major savings in their treatment costs by funding 334 
farmers to reduce agricultural pollution. However, property rights to attributes like 335 
biodiversity are notoriously hard to define and enforce, and indigenous people and local 336 
farmers are often at the mercy of more powerful commercial interests. Hence, poorly designed 337 
privatisation can exacerbate risks to biodiversity56,57. 338 
Implementation of policies goes well beyond identifying an appropriate intervention. Politics 339 
demands overcoming vested interests and oft intense lobbying. For example, fossil fuel 340 
interests have clear incentives to portray carbon prices as expensive or regressive30. In fact, by 341 
stimulating cost-efficient abatement, such prices are generally the cheapest way to satisfy 342 
environmental constraints. The true impediment to their implementation is lobbying by the 343 
many powerful and wealthy interests that stand to lose from abatement policies24,34. If carbon 344 
pricing is politically impossible now, transitional policies supporting new technologies (e.g., 345 
subsidies for renewable energy or electric vehicles) can induce national engagement and 346 
promote counter-lobbies58. A particular problem arises when the benefits of pollution are 347 
concentrated among a few members of society while the costs are dispersed. Since it is easier 348 
to organize lobbies around a concentrated interest, polluters may be able to block a societally 349 
advantageous outcome. To counter the oft opaque influence of lobbies, which may occur by 350 
way of privileged information, campaign contributions or even bribes, overall transparency is 351 
essential, calling for interventions like mandatory and publicly accessible lobbying registers. 352 
Here, too, unintended consequences must be taken into account. An outright ban on lobbying, 353 
for example, might backfire by inducing increased corruption59. This, in turn, can have 354 
several negative consequences, including reduced abatement investments60. A clear challenge 355 
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is designing policy instruments to minimize political resistance both by lobby groups and by 356 
voters, who might dislike the distributional impacts of a policy. While no panacea, one way 357 
forward is via policy instruments specifically designed to raise revenue that can then be used 358 
to increase political support61,62. For example, some European green tax reforms have reduced 359 
voters’ tax burden elsewhere, via reductions in other taxes. Subsidy removal must be 360 
accompanied by compensating measures.  Similarly, refunded emissions payment systems 361 
have made higher charges on industrial nitrous oxide emissions politically feasible37. Table 2 362 
classifies each of these policy instruments as belonging to the intermediate category.  363 
 364 
Technological change & population dynamics 365 
New technologies are a powerful engine of socioeconomic transformation, but they 366 
themselves can cause transgression of planetary boundaries by rendering resources accessible 367 
to massive exploitation. Much depends on which technologies are improved63. The RD&D 368 
behind technological change is a purposeful human activity; its intensity and direction 369 
respond to incentives64. Policies, therefore, can and must be designed to both stimulate 370 
innovation in technologies that support sustainable growth and weaken the incentives to 371 
develop technologies that threaten it65.  372 
Since fossil fuels have become a key source of energy, technical improvements have led to 373 
continuous productivity increases in their extraction, processing, and use. These technological 374 
improvements have facilitated a sufficient increase in supply for the relative cost of energy to 375 
be stagnant or even falling despite increasing demand. Hence, fossil fuel consumption has 376 
increased in parallel with economic activity. Raising fossil fuel prices is a way to break this 377 
link and provide incentives for energy saving technologies, an effect powerfully illustrated by 378 
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the innovations that followed the oil crisis in the 1970s. It can also be seen by the differences 379 
in fossil fuel use of countries with divergent tax policies66. 380 
New technologies for exploration often make previously unrecoverable, even unknown, 381 
reserves exploitable. When such exploitation poses a threat to sustainability, subsidies to 382 
develop green technologies are likely a key component of policies for sustainability. 383 
However, such instruments on their own are generally insufficient. They need to be combined 384 
with policies that directly deal with the pollution or resource use in order to reduce the 385 
incentives for the type of technological innovation that threatens sustainability31,63. 386 
Policy-induced green technical progress can make it less costly and hence more likely for 387 
countries to impose pollutant pricing and other policies. A telling example is the Montreal 388 
Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, which provided the international 389 
governance structure within which countries used specific pieces of legislation to phase out 390 
and ban the use of halocarbons. Its success was due, in large part, to the development of 391 
alternative technologies. Overall, a balanced mix of policy instruments for abatement and 392 
investment in clean technologies is often the best recipe for dealing with global environmental 393 
threats. Addressing ocean acidification or climate change requires both carbon pricing to 394 
reduce emissions cost-effectively in the near term and RD&D subsidies or feed-in tariffs to 395 
drive innovation and diffusion of advanced technologies for deeper emissions reductions in 396 
the future67. Counteracting agricultural, forestry or marine exploitations that threaten 397 
biodiversity (and, more generally, boundaries 3-5) necessitate international agreements on a 398 
suite of policies that restrain current exploitation but also research into novel future 399 
technologies that can radically reduce the pressure of the underlying societal processes on the 400 
ecosystems concerned (see Table 3). 401 
Developing countries have their own priorities and, to make green policies acceptable, they 402 
must allow for alleviation of chronic poverty and demographic challenges31. Development 403 
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agencies and local governments must use policies that promote green transformation while 404 
respecting the interests of the poor, for example, by encouraging local resource management. 405 
One impetus for change may come from growing popular demand for a cleaner environment, 406 
in particular in major cities. Energy and transport policies that deal with local health and 407 
environmental issues are often conducive to several planetary boundaries, including biosphere 408 
integrity, climate change, novel entities, and aerosols. While regulations may initially be 409 
selected, some of the more flexible instruments highlighted in Table 2 have the advantage of 410 
both saving money and raising revenues to address funding and distributional challenges. 411 
Demographic changes, meanwhile, pose a significant challenge to any implementation 412 
strategy. Policies must be adaptable to a world with a population increase of several billion 413 
people striving for higher standards of living. While not typically part of an environmental 414 
policy portfolio, increasing reproductive choice via women’s educational opportunities and 415 
access to family planning services is an essential component of avoiding threats to planetary 416 
boundaries68. Limiting population growth alone will not suffice, but demographic changes 417 
must not be ignored in policy conversations about the Anthropocene. Satisfying fundamental 418 
needs is possible—including the economic growth urgently needed for poverty alleviation—419 
but only if economic activity is steered by strong policy instruments toward sectors and 420 
technologies that avoid threats to planetary boundaries. 421 
 422 
Concluding thoughts 423 
The range of topics discussed has been broad but is far from exhaustive. Developing policies 424 
for the multitude of complex issues related to planetary boundaries is a task both vast and 425 
urgent. Formulating policies that adequately address all boundaries is daunting, but the 426 
urgency is such that we cannot let complexity be an excuse for inaction. We have argued here 427 
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that policies are available, but policy design needs to deal with a multitude of geographic 428 
levels, interconnected boundaries, and spatial, ecological and socio-political complexities. 429 
Doing so requires interdisciplinary collaboration both among academics and practitioners at 430 
all levels of policy intervention. This Perspective can only discuss the broad directions of this 431 
large undertaking but hopes to inspire a new field to deal with this vital predicament. 432 
  433 
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ILLUSTRATIONS: Figures and Tables  589 
590 
Figure 1 Planetary boundaries, tipping points and policies 591 
Transgressing planetary boundaries increases the risk that the Earth System trajectory (blue 592 
solid curve) crosses a planetary tipping point (bifurcation in trajectory). Avoiding the tipping 593 
point (lower dashed line) means remaining in Holocene-like conditions. (‘Stabilized Earth’ 594 
trajectory in ref. 10). Crossing the tipping point (higher dashed line) leads to very different 595 
conditions, e.g. a ‘Hothouse Earth’ trajectory, implying serious disruptions to ecosystems and 596 
society. Policies in the right column help avoid the tipping point and achieve a ‘Stabilized 597 
Earth’ trajectory. However, significant loss of resilience when multiple boundaries are 598 
crossed increases the risk of crossing the planetary tipping point and thus decreases the 599 
degrees of freedom available to policy makers (from green to red). BII, Biodiversity 600 
Intactness Index; E/MSY, extinctions per million species per year. P Phosphorous, N 601 
Nitrogen; SES Socio-Ecological System. 602 
 603 
 604 
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 605 
Figure 2 Planetary Boundaries and Policy Trade-offs 606 
The arrows illustrate the principle of trade-offs involving a policy aiming to reduce stress on 607 
one planetary boundary (as an example, we take increased forestry to reduce climate change) 608 
that may have side effects (positive or negative) on other boundaries (e.g., biosphere integrity, 609 
land-system change, freshwater use and biochemical flows). The arrows give an approximate 610 
illustration of a possible effect with respect to current conditions4, where green is safe, yellow 611 
increasing risk and red high risk. 612 
 613 
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Table 1 Planetary boundaries, their drivers and the main sectors of the economy 615 
concerned. 616 
PLANETARY 
BOUNDARY 
MAIN DRIVING FORCE MAIN SECTORS, ACTIVITIES AND INPUTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DRIVERS 
1. Climate change Concentration of CO2, N20, CH4, CFCs in the atmosphere. Fossil fuels in energy and transport, industry, cement, agriculture and forestry, livestock. 
2. Ocean acidification Dissolve CO2 in the oceans. All above activities emitting CO2.  
3. Biosphere integrity 
Land and resource use, ecosystem degradation, climate 
change.  
Forestry, agriculture, fisheries, urban expansion, tourism. 
4. Land system change Change in cropland & forest area.  Agriculture, forestry, urban expansion. 
5. Freshwater use 
Use of freshwater from rivers, lakes, reservoirs and 
groundwater.  
Agriculture, some industries, domestic use. 
6. Novel entities 
Human introduced chemicals and other engineered material 
and organisms.  
Research and development sectors linked to plastics, pharmaceuticals, and pesticides. Fossil 
fuels. Petrochemistry. 
7. Stratospheric ozone 
depletion 
Concentration of CFCs and HCFCs in the atmosphere. Air conditioning, refrigeration, antiperspirants. 
8. Biogeochemical flows Fertilizers, waste flows from industrial activities.  Agriculture, mining, (chemical) industry. 
9. Aerosols Emissions of black carbon, organic carbon, sulfates, nitrates.  Heating, cooking, transportation, industry or forest fires. Fossil fuels. 
 617 
Table 2 Policy instruments by type and by concept of rights over nature. 618 
 619 
  
“Pigouvian” 
(price-based) 
“Coasian” 
(rights-based) 
Regulatory Legal/Information /Finance 
R
ig
h
ts p
rim
arily
 allo
cated
 to
 
V
ictim
s 
Taxes 
Charges, fees, tariff 
Tradable permits/quotas 
(auctioned) 
Bans 
Strict liability 
Stricter financial regulation 
 
Deposit-refund 
Refunded charge 
(Green) certificate 
Common property resource 
management 
Zoning 
Performance/technology 
standards 
Negligence liability 
Financial Regulation 
Public participation 
P
o
llu
te
r 
Subsidies 
Tradable permits/quotas 
(allocated freely) 
Permits 
Voluntary agreements 
Information disclosure 
  
Most instruments here apply to both consumption- and production-based, negative externalities. Positive, learning-by-doing spillovers require their own sets of 
interventions via technology standards, patent law, etc that can be categorized in an analogous manner. 
  620 
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Table 3 Planetary Boundaries: Policy instruments at national/international level and 621 
implementation strategies 622 
Due to their physical characteristics, multiple planetary boundaries can be safeguarded 623 
through the right combination of immediate implementation strategies, additional national 624 
policies and international actions. Numbering as in Table 1. The first two boundaries are 625 
connected through the role of carbon dioxide. There are close ties between 3,4 and 5 through 626 
land use, and all three are also affected by climate change. We also group 6 plus 7 because 627 
ozone depletion is caused by novel chemicals. 628 
 629 
PLANETARY BOUNDARY 
IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION 
STRATEGIES 
ADDITIONAL NATIONAL 
STRATEGIES 
INTERNATIONAL ACTION 
1 Climate change 
2 Ocean acidification  
[Linked to 3-5, 7-9] 
Eliminate fossil fuel subsidies. 
Facilitate breakthrough low-carbon and 
energy efficiency technologies through 
research and development (R&D) 
subsidies and infrastructure investment 
(e.g., smart grids, improved transmission 
and distribution). 
Carbon pricing through taxes and/or 
tradable permits. 
Carbon emission regulations. 
Technology policies for reducing all 
greenhouse gases (GHG). 
Carbon sequestration incentives. 
Implementation of Paris Agreement 
pledges. 
Negotiation of additional agreements and 
more stringent pledges as follow-up to 
Paris Agreement. 
Climate finance for mitigation in 
developing countries. 
3 Biosphere integrity 
4 Land system change 
5 Freshwater use 
[Linked to 1, 2, 8] 
Reduction and rationalization of 
agricultural, fishing, mining, forestry and 
aquaculture subsidies. 
Improved regulation of primary product 
industries. 
Water use pricing and regulation. 
Market-based instruments for reducing 
agricultural and water pollution. 
Water markets and trading. 
Taxes/regulation for hazardous waste & 
mining. 
Landfill and waste charges. 
New protected areas. 
Strengthen property rights. 
Regional and international agreements 
and coordination necessary for 
management of transboundary water, land 
and marine resources (e.g., internationally 
shared marine reserves & water, major 
river basins, deep sea resources or forest 
biomes). 
6 Novel entities 
7 Stratospheric ozone depletion 
[Linked to 1-3, 9] 
Speed up and strengthen the US TSCA, 
EU REACH and similar liability and 
authorization legislation. 
Improve information on risks. 
Technology policies to reduce use of 
harmful entities. 
Taxes and regulations to control over-use 
Improved coordination and additional 
agreements for novel entities (e.g., using 
the Montreal Protocol on ozone regulation 
as a model). 
8 Biogeochemical flows 
[Linked to 1, 3-4] 
Similar to 3-5. Planning with catchment areas. 
Empower local users. 
Some coordination to reduce large-scale 
and shared impacts. 
9 Atmospheric aerosol loading 
[Linked to 1, 6] 
Improved information on impacts and 
risks. 
Monitoring, reduction and control of 
forest fires. 
Technology policies, taxes and regulation 
to control over-use and pollution (e.g., 
from vehicles, industry, fires). 
Coordination to reduce large-scale and 
trans-boundary pollution (e.g. from forest 
fires, industrial pollution). 
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